Portion of the report of the Gibson Inquiry, published on December 19, 2013. The Gibson Inquiry has closed document review in 2012. (1)
In 2010, he British High Court, represented by Lord Chief Justice John Thomas dismissed an appeal from the Foreign Secretary in the Binyam Mohamed case and addressed the issue of the UK intelligence services’ use of torture at the behest of the US War on Terror head on. At the time, this seemed a proper, relevant, and necessary illustration of the judiciary’s independence and its need to place executive authority under review. The UK had covered its counter-terrorism operations with a cloud of exemptions, derogations, and immunity since 2000. It went so far as amending laws to create new sanctions, using prerogatives as orders, classifying material which assisted in wrongdoing, and, in the case of the judicial branch, refusing to sit on the operations of a friendly nation-state on the theory that doing so would violate jus gentium—despite the government’s admission of “serious” violations of international law. The British High Court’s ruling was important then, but after the Gibson Inquiry into MI-5 / MI-6 collusion with the CIA closed in 2012, it is even more important now, when hypervigilance, hyperclassification, and multiplying extrajudicial orders give the impression that everything is out of our control, out of our sight, left thoroughly unchecked, and cannot be stopped.
The United States is justifiably focused on the circus-like saga surrounding the release of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s CIA torture report. The very Senate Committee that created the 6,800-page report voted for its release, but a White House paralysed by the possible consequences of its release and a CIA unwilling to accept, reveal, investigate, prosecute, amend, reconcile, or apologize for its part in US torture still block and red-tape the report at every level. However, we seem to forget that 53 other nations were involved in the CIA’s rendition program. If supranational courts have forced some nations to face the reality of collusion and investigate the crimes committed by their leaders, others are in a permanent and affirmed state of denial. As for the UK, the CIA itself has acknowledged that its idea for world domination through torture could not have reached the heights it did without the help of Her Majesty’s most trusted agents. The pressure is on all the way through Westminster, and in the pages of the Telegraph.
Binyam Mohamed, from Ethiopia and UK national, detained at Guantanamo between 2004 and 2009. Here, upon his release. (via The Guardian)
The Binyam Mohamed ruling contains a lot that deserves a closer look, or at least another look, with the gift of hindsight. Ideologies, secrets, backdoors, and public acknowledgements—you can find it all if you address the Control Principle and uphold open justice.
Fighting secrecy in courts: PII certificates
Intelligence operations that touch on important foreign relations rarely suffer any disclosures. The few leaks that do happen are mostly unauthorized. Many are severely condemned, and almost all become a source of concern for both the subject of the disclosure, whose dubious actions are exposed to the world, and its source, who is vilified and criminalised. However, it is crucial to uphold the independence of the judiciary. The right to truth cannot take a back seat to foreign policy interests, especially in the face of gross human rights violations. Faced with the difficulty of ruling against a pressured and pressuring executive authority and the overarching need to address a case of torture so severe it involved at least four different sovereign states, the High Court weighed in on a conflict of principles that would define the legal battles surrounding the War on Terror: public interest versus lasting foreign cooperation.
1. Is there “uncertainty” in the US/UK relationship?
It is almost impossible to weigh the importance of the UK/US relationship while their intelligence cooperation agreement is still classified. UKUSA – born out of the 1944 “BRUSA Circuit” and famous for spawning the Five Eyes signals-intelligence alliance in 1955 – has defined a transatlantic partnership that predates the War on Terror, and even the Cold War. Seemingly intended to create a rapprochement between Europe and the US after World War II, UKUSA often isolates the rest of the continent to the benefit of a sprawling group of intelligence services —MI-5, MI-6, GCHQ, SAS—serving, aiding, and completely abetting the CIA in its activities overseas. It is preposterous to assume there is any sort of uncertainty in the US/UK relationship, but a legal decision is likely to make precedent if it somehow undermines the principles of secrecy and national security that currently define executive authority in counter-terrorism and military deployment. Such a ruling would undermine the common assumption that intelligence operations are the executive’s sole prerogative and that the judicial will defer to the executive in gauging their importance.
But the case of Binyam Mohamed proved that a need for judicial review was pressing, that the scope of the CIA rendition and torture program was so vast it could not stand to remain unchecked much longer. The pages-long ruling endlessly debates the hypothetical consequences of disclosing intelligence operations that led Binyam Mohamed’s detention at Guantanamo—the detention of a man who ceaselessly claimed to be innocent and suffered hell at the hands of agents never bound by habeas rules. Here is the core of the debate:
Making it “. . . clear that the US Government’s position is that, if the redacted paragraphs are made public, then the US Government will reevaluate its intelligence-sharing relationship with the UK with the real risk that it would reduce the intelligence provided. It was and remains (so far as we are aware) the judgement of the Foreign Secretary that the US Government might carry that threat out and this would seriously prejudice the national security of the UK.” (paragraph 87, quoting paragraph 62 of the judgement)
The Foreign Secretary asserted very clearly that the intelligence-sharing agreement is not necessarily based on a needs assessment and equality in providing information but is deeply rooted in complete codependence which he must protect above all else—including, it seems, from the judiciary’s authority over wrongdoing committed by services under executive power. In fourth judgement, the Court ruled that exposing the truth was one valid concern in a case that was arguably necessary to place in the public domain due to the grave violations it illustrated. However, the threat of the US turning its back on the UK due to a breach of trust by pulling out of UKUSA was an even concern than the condition of Binyam Mohamed and countless other victims of the War on Terror, from Kabul to Rabat, from Bucarest to Cuba. The fourth judgement made clear that executive interests supersede human rights law:
Whatever views may be held as to the continuing threat made by the Government of the US to prevent a short summary of the treatment of Mr. Mohamed being put into the public domain by this court, it would not, in all the circumstances we have set out and in the light of the action taken, be in the public interest to expose the UK to what the Foreign Secretary still considers to be the real risk of the loss of intelligence so vital to the safety of our day to day life. If the information in the redacted paragraphs which we consider so important to the rule of law . . . it must now be for the US Government to consider changing its position or itself putting that information into the public domain. (Para. 107)
Simply put, the consequences would be so grave to the UK that the Court refused to take such a responsibility and instead let the US decide whether to ultimately reveal—or maintain as classified—information in a case against a UK agency concerning UK agency wrongdoing and presented in a UK court of law.
US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton (l) and UK Foreign Secretary William Hague (r), July 2011 (Reuters)
This is the extent of the Control Principle. It is so unbelievably central to the mere survival of the imperialist island that it is willing to sacrifice fundamental rights and detach parts of its democratic principles in order to maintain core agreements that are essential to maintaining the executive authority in power. UKUSA is more than an intelligence sharing agreement; as its acronym suggests, it is an almost literal blood-sharing treaty on which the national security and foreign policy of the two most influential world powers is based. The fourth judgement made it clear that the Foreign Secretary would not risk weakening the UK’s life force just for some man whose identity was so unimportant that his alleged crimes barely warranted address in a court of law.
2. Is disclosure a breach of trust?
How much trust does the US and the UK vest in UKUSA, and what measures can hold operations created and carried out under its provisions accountable to justice?
According to the Control Principle, the country that provide information is responsible for its confidentiality, never the country that receives the information. If one end is closed, the other is open, by principle. In reality, however, this principle is often subject to political affiliations, bilateral agreements, and traditional respect for the classification and secrecy inherent to intelligence sharing protocols. A country that provided another with information might consider the receiving country revealing its methods, sources, or content a breach of bilateral agreements that could harm the vital foreign interests in the name of which the US and the UK have colluded on many recent foreign intelligence cases—the GCHQ/CIA case of a drone strike in Pakistan in Noor Khan v. Secretary of State, for example. LJ Thomas was right in asserting that, in matters of national security, the judicial branch defers to the executive, which is traditionally responsible for diplomatic, military, and intelligence decisions. However, the judicial also has a democratic right to check and balance powers granted to the executive—be they constitutional powers, like national security, or extraordinary powers beyond legislation in times of exemption, like counter terrorism—by intervening in time of wrongdoing. In this capacity, the judicial has the authority to place the control principle under review.
The difficulty in addressing the circumstances of Binyam Mohamed’s arrest, detention, interrogation, and torture lays with the fact doing so would reveal the working relationships between the UK and the US in the War on Terror. Weighing the confidentiality of intelligence-sharing protocols against the need for open justice, however, LJ Thomas carefully crafted what he referred to as “an exercise in judicial patience.” He detailed his very thought process based on questions of principle, on one hand, and previous jurisprudence justifying an extraordinary case of release and publication, on the other. The Foreign Secretary, William Hague, immediately submitted public immunity certificates in order to protect the confidentiality of UKUSA. Here, collusion between the UK and the US was more than an allegation; the court factually asserted it, with LJ Thomas himself referring to UKUSA, although not by name but by content, saying it was “no secret” that the text existed and that it was still in operation:
It is no secret—and indeed it has been an unbroken theme of the Foreign Secretary’s position—that there is a close intelligence sharing arrangement between the UK and the USA. If the redacted paragraphs do not themselves contain secret or intelligence material, and the intelligence-sharing arrangements between the UK and the USA are publicly declared, one may enquire why the redaction is necessary. In essence it comes to this: Unless the control principle prevails, the intelligence-sharing arrangements between the USA and the UK will be reviewed, and the following review may, not will, become less “productive” to presumably, the disadvantage of both countries, although I shall assume to the much greater disadvantage of the UK. The Foreign Secretary believes that such consequences will inevitably follow any contravention of the control principle, whatever the circumstances in which or the reasons for the court’s decision that it should be disapplied. The difficulty therefore arises from the control principle itself, and its application in troubled times.
Sir Richard Dearlove, chief of secret intelligence from 1999 to 2004, who recently made headlines for demanding more oversight of UK intelligence operations (2)
What LJ Thomas mentions may not be known conventionally or acknowledged officially, but it has been a constant in diplomatic relations for a long time, disseminated through conversations with journalists and in legal analyses: UKUSA exists, and both government have highlighted and perhaps even reinforced it in the “troubled times” that are the War on Terror. The control principle would allow the UK to breach UKUSA’s promises of confidentiality unless the Foreign Secretary could sufficiently prove that disclosure would be extremely damaging – not just the information itself, but the fact that a judicial court of the UK would release the information in its own sovereign right without the US’s prior consent. Jonathan Sumption QC, speaking on behalf of the Foreign Secretary, argued that such a disclosure would be “profoundly damaging to the interests of this country” and even “irresponsible”. As for the Foreign Secretary himself, in his Summary Grounds of Resistance to support his demand for public immunity, he never fell short of emphatic qualifiers:
. . . the claim was said to be “unarguable,” and the allegation that the UK government had been “mixed up” in, so as to facilitate it, the alleged wrongdoing (by USA authorities) is untrue”. It was averred that “no department or agency of the UK government was involved in the claimant’s alleged torture in Morocco and Afghanistan. Nor has the UK government done anything to facilitate the Claimant being subjected to torture.” The contention was effectively repeated in the Detailed Grounds of Resistance: “[T]he pleaded case on facilitation wholly fails.”
The Court refused Binyam Mohamed, who knew UK agents were present during his interrogation and may have facilitated his seizure, the right to access documents pertaining to his detention, in complete violation of open justice. Mohamed’s lawyers rooted their claim for disclosure of those documents—not only to the claimant but also to anyone having access to the ruling, which is everyone—in a 35-year-old principle in the case Norwich Pharmacal Co. Formulated in circumstances far different from the gruesome and harrowing complexities of the rendition program, that principle maintains that the perpetrator in a situation of facilitation, even involuntary, must cooperate in the course of justice:
If through no fault of his own a person gets mixed up in the tortious acts of others as to facilitate their wrongdoing, he may incur no personal liability but he comes under a duty to assist the person who has been wronged by giving him full information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers. . . . Justice requires that he should co-operate in righting the wrong if he unwittingly facilitated its perpetration.
What Norwich defines is not even collusion. It does not require intent and does not even demand liability from the third party. Still, it view disclosure as justified and part of the course of reparative justice. The Foreign Secretary’s response seems disproportionate. He did not wish to to protect the public from finding out that the UK collaborated in torture. Rather, he simply did not wish to disclose information related to the intelligence activities of another nation—even intelligence activities inflicted on the body of a British national. What is now a question of “vital foreign interest” darkens and becomes more ominous by the minute: it seems that preserving UKUSA is more important than the rules of law that bind the Foreign Secretary—not only in his position of governance, but, as LJ Thomas said, as any other litigant. If Norwich applies to a severe case of premeditated collusion resulting in gross human rights violations, and it surely does, then it reinforces the demand for disclosure. Redacted paragraphs related to the surveillance and arrest of Binyam Mohamed show that the UK did not “involuntarily facilitate” the actions of the CIA. Rather, the CIA was aiding the UK in apprehending a suspect they believed was a threat to the UK because they believed threats to UK national security also posed threats to the US. This is how Binyam Mohamed ended up in Guantanamo Bay:
(i) The SyS and the SIS were interested in (Mr. Mohamed) because of his residence in the United Kingdom, his connection with suspected persons in the United Kingdom, the period of time spent in Pakistan and Afghanistan, those whom he was said to have been with and the gravity of the allegations made against him at the time.
(ii) We have no doubt that, on the basis of that information, the SIS and SyS were right to conclude that [Mr. Mohamed] was a person of great potential significance and a serious potential threat to the national security of the United Kingdom. There was therefore every reason to seek to obtain as much intelligence from him as was possible in accordance with the rule of law and to cooperate as fully as possible with the US authorities to that end.
The problem is that gathering intelligence in accordance with the rule of law excludes the concept of full cooperation with the US authorities when it comes to terrorist suspects in the War on Terror. Continuing:
(iii) It was clear from reports that (Mr. Mohamed) was held incommunicado from 10 April 2002 whilst a series of interviews were conducted by the US authorities in April 2002, during which he had asked for a lawyer and had been refused . . .
(ix) By 20 September 2002, it was clear to the SyS that (Mr, Mohamed) was being held at a covert location (either by the authorities of the United States or under direct control of the United States) which was not a US military facility, such as Bagram. It is clear to us that they knew that he was not in a regular US facility, that the facility in which he was being detained and questioned was that of a foreign government (other than Afghanistan) and that the US authorities had direct access to information being obtained from him.
Aerial view of the Salt Pit, a CIA black site just north of Kabul, Afghanistan
Of course, UKUSA is not solely responsible for what happened to Binyam Mohamed and countless others whose rights were denied to prosecute the War on Terror. The CIA rendition program encompassed 54 countries, including the United States, all of which cooperated willfully and with the acquiescence of local authorities. To various degrees, all 54 work under intelligence sharing agreements similar to UKUSA. What makes UKUSA so special is the very specific nature of the diplomatic, military, political, and legal relations between the UK and the US—a deep entrenchment enshrined in an agreement dating initially to 1940. Each country has proved to be invaluable to the other. They are, in fact, almost incestuous. If current relations between the UK and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) are more than glacial, the government can only halt the rule of law and judicial review of intelligence-sharing agreements using political and diplomatic protocols. The political normalcy of “vital foreign interests” regarding intelligence gathering and sharing are now even more important to the activities exercised and practiced by the executive of both nations involved in the bilateral agreement. The content of UKUSA is classified. Having been placed to the forefront of current conversation due to being the genesis of the Five Eyes program, UKUSA contains much more—and the very fact that it exists may in itself become an objection to the understanding that intelligence principles are sacred and far beyond the concept of public interest.
The language that the Foreign Secretary used to justify his public immunity certificate may be vague in rhetoric, but it is vastly telling in its interpretation. In paragraph 45 of the ruling, LJ Thomas contemplates the arguments the government brought forward and questions the very nature of UK-USA relations, so necessary that they can apparently destroy political stability:
The Foreign Secretary’s first PII certificate referred to the uncertainty which would be introduced into the working relationship between this country and the USA if the disclosure were ordered. The second PII certificate stated in terms that “disclosure of US intelligence information by order of our Courts would breach the trust and the fundamental requirement for confidentiality that lies at the heart of the UK’s liaison relationship with the US intelligence agencies. . . . It is not simply confidentiality and the secrecy of intelligence material that is an issue, however, but also the issue of the control that one government has over the intelligence information that it shares with another government in the expectation of confidentiality. . . . Breaching this principle will have significant implications that run far more broadly than this case.”
It is difficult at this stage not to simply demand the full disclosure of UKUSA in order to understand these “significant implications,” highlighted so strongly that they almost demand that we ask the question of what exactly is at stake. LJ Thomas’s ruling precipitated a hypocritical, voluntary disclosure of the 1955 version of the agreement, displayed on the NSA website as a quaint historical relic from the early days of the Cold War. The second part of this paragraph seems to let LJ Thomas know that he is facing something that is much bigger than his actual mandate:
The third PII certificate, acknowledging that the UK courts had power “in principle to disclose information provided by a foreign liaison service or derived from such information without the consent of the provider (and even against its expressed will),” concluded that the exercise of the power would be “extraordinary.” That was close to the Foreign Secretary’s assertion in the meeting with Secretary of State Clinton on 12 May that “the British Government would continue to make the case that it continued to be an inviolable principle of intelligence co-operation that we did not give away other people’s secrets.” An “inviolable” principle does not appear to acknowledge or permit any exceptions. Expressed in this way, the control principle assumes a level of primacy which diminishes the responsibility of the court as the ultimate decision-marker virtually to extinction.
LJ Thomas, who does not sound amused in the slightest by the blood promises exchanged between two Foreign Affairs peers, essentially understands that intelligence supersedes the rule of law in a way that can suffer no judicial review. But if the “international conspiracy” of the CIA rendition program is not extraordinary then what is?
CIA rendition map trajectory: including black sites, refuel stops, and detention zones (Europe, North Africa). Chart by Trevor Paglen
“the exercise of the control principle would be extraordinary.”
This decision matters because of the control principle that prevents disclosure on one end while authorizing it — in principle — on the other. When it comes to rendition and torture programs, the tendency to cover accessed, accessible, and processed information is US-centric. As the CIA’s activities have came under increasing congressional review, politicians and journalists have largely framed them as matters of strict American concern, and, more importantly, American accountability. They dominate US-based media, which perceive them only through an American prism. As a result, politicians and public alike have come to see issues like how the government has classified the CIA torture report and which branch of government has the hypothetical authority to release it only as US problem. Most media outlets completely omit the 53 other sovereign nation-states that cooperated with the CIA, with the exception of a handful of unconventional journalists unafraid of tapping into raw sources.
But investigations all over the world have released information about the program in various batches. US news outlets initiated a few—most notably a 2007 report from ABC news that itself precipitated investigations in Lithuania. The UK has managed to keep the degree of its involvement in the CIA torture program largely under wraps for two reasons. First, legislative review has been slow because many MPs do not possess the security clearance necessary to access relevant material on MI-6, MI-5 activities, hindering legislative review. Second, it is impossible for UK courts to sit on the activities, especially intelligence-related activities, of other sovereign states. If the latter is a well-enshrined principle of international law, the former is a worrisome indictment of an overwhelming national security principle overriding basic democratic checks and balances. This is a sore point in the UK, where judicial deference in matters of national security has been put to the test, each time with respect to UKUSA.
Put shortly, it might be possible to release information on CIA activities by looking at what the CIA requested from other agencies.
The distrust inherent in intelligence communities raises the question of trust not between the government and the governed, but between governments themselves. Failing to uphold that secrecy by disclosing another nation’s intelligence, in violation of a classified intelligence-sharing agreement, would effectively destroy that agreement and undermine the credibility of the intelligence both nations share. If a nation sees its partner in an intelligence-sharing agreement as untrustworthy then it is unlikely to share intelligence high quality or value. A study on intelligence sharing in counter-terrorism by J. Walsh explains this in some detail:
. . . This understandable concern with security opens the possibility that shared intelligence might be of questionable reliability. States sometimes forgo the benefits they would accrue from defection in the short run in order to maintain their reputation for honest dealing. But concerns about security also complicate efforts to reassure partners by undertaking publicly observable commitments that, if violated, would undermine a government’s reputation. The details of most intelligence sharing agreements are kept secret from third parties. This makes it difficult for one partner to harm another’s reputation through an accusation of defection, since doing so necessitates revealing details about the intelligence that has or was supposed to have been shared.
The question remains as to whether the US would consider a judicial review of the intelligence—not the UKUSA intelligence agreement itself—to be a violation of the UKUSA agreement if it is part of a domestic judicial review rather than an investigation by a supranational or international court. The Foreign Secretary will not wait for an answer to that question. Defection is an issue of the state’s reliability at home and abroad. As the above table from Walsh’s study points out, the “transaction cost” is low because the US sees EU nations as trustworthy, reliable, and committed to achieving its same goals in the the War on Terror. After all, anything that could be a potential threat to the US could also threaten EU nations. From the nature of intelligence sharing and intelligence operations between the US and EU states, Walsh concludes,
. . . the gains that each state secures from sharing are larger than the expected cost of defection by the other state. Sharing should be straightforward to arrange here, and the participating states should focus on developing technical mechanisms—such as shared databases, common security procedures, joint training of personnel, and so on- that allows them to share information efficiently.
Applying this to the rendition program definitely extends to way more than collecting surveillance data: It is about the financial cost of deploying specially trained troops, training local armed forces (from law enforcement to paramilitaries), and sharing a defence apparatus. In short, allied states demand support not just from intelligence agencies but also from state departments, defence departments, and judicial departments—branches of the executive normally separated in their actions and subjected to different budgets.
Attempts to obtain documents related to CIA activities will fail outside of the US, whether they are pursued through legislative or judicial review. But the CIA never worked alone. A 2004 internal report requested by the Office of General Counsel acknowledge that the agency’s torture and rendition programs could not have worked as well as they did had so many other nations not collaborated so willingly. The extent of collaboration in Europe is staggering: Two reports—by rapporteurs Marty in 2006 and Fava in 2007—managed to track down rendition flights, prison names, and even the duration of detention. Most of what we actually know of the CIA’s torture program is in the possession of the EU Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights, where, in December 2013, Ben Emmerson referred to the program as “the largest international conspiracy.” Assuming that Sen. Dianne Feinstein holds and controls the only body of information regarding the torture program is a mistake. Collaborating agencies can disclose what the CIA will not, and nations in which the CIA operated can request it for review. If the CIA’s High-Value Detainee program simplistically could evade responsibility through extraterritoriality, it may have committed the expensive mistake of ignoring the importance future administrations in the countries where it operated would place on the right to truth.
What matters in the intelligence-sharing relationship is who in a bilateral agreement has the power, the control. Who has the resources, political and financial, to ensure compliance every step of the way. Who, in short, is the dominant state. Exercising the control principle on the UK front would result in controlled, lawful release of information about the CIA rendition program. That would imply that the UK is the dominant state in the US-UK relationship—that it has full sovereignty and dominance over its intelligence agencies and is capable of acting unilaterally and individually without asking for the CIA’s prior consent. In a paragraph cited above, however, Thomas presumes that violating UKUSA would be more damaging to the UK. That effectively means that the CIA controls the UK’s compliance in its counter-terrorism operations:
Dominant states must pay costs to manage a hierarchy as well. They must devote resources to closely monitoring subordinates’ compliance, to providing the benefits outlined in their agreement to share, and to punishing defection. For one state to effectively play the role of the dominant partner, it must control considerable political and economic resources of value to the subordinate state. Such power resources allow the dominant state to offer more valuable benefits and to more credibly threaten effective punishment when it detects defection. . . . Agreeing to . . . riskier forms of cooperation signals to the subordinate that the dominant state is reasonably secure that their hierarchical arrangement will work effectively.
Since UKUSA is still classified, the door is wide open for wild speculation on what the credible punishment can be in case of defection—or assimilated defection, should a Foreign Secretary fail to obtain a PII certificate like in the Binyam Mohamed case. More relevant, however, is the extent to which the UK and other states cooperated with the CIA’s torture and rendition program. Providing intelligence, detaching agents, deploying armed forces, and providing resources both material (planes, secure landings trips in airports) and political (corruption of governing agents to ensure silence, creation of prisons outside the legal system, interference and tampering with evidence during inquiries) all count as “riskier forms of cooperation.” As the dominant state, the US must be confident in its hierarchical system. But why? In order to answer that question, we need to see the UKUSA agreement.
First page of the 1955 UKUSA Agreement, declassified in 2010. (3)
Can we look elsewhere for disclosure of CIA activities under the rendition program?
We also need subordinate states to exercise their own right of control. As long as the executive branch sees independent judicial review as a sign of defection, arguments like those put forward by the Foreign Secretary will always halt investigation and attempt to either scare judges into demanding release of information or maintain permanent confidentiality by creating closed submissions and closed rulings. If secret courts provide secret rulings on secret documentation, the end result will be the same—democratic accountability for violations committed by intelligence agencies will remain at absolutely zero.
Requesting accountability is a daunting, seemingly endless task. Patching together information on systematic and widespread human rights violations on each corner of the globe is a harrowing, Kafkaesque game of fill-in-the-blanks, with officials flat-out denying implication in the face of irrefutable evidence. And there is always the horrifying possibility of finding more than we dug for. Looking at the rendition and torture programs through a single national prism focuses only on a tiny portion of what that contains. Ultimately, it is a disservice to the hope for international prosecution.
Waiting for local judicial administrations to run their course, and fall on the desk of a judge with Thomas’s value system, may sound pointless. However, it might prove more effective than waiting for the US Congress to hold its previous administrations to account. If the EU Parliament reports were comprehensive enough to launch investigations into member-states, the path to figure out the extent of cooperation in nations still in denial is to find a way, through open justice, to release intelligence-sharing agreements. As LJ Thomas writes (emphasis mine),
[T]he confidentiality principle is indeed subject to the clear limitation that the government and intelligence services can never provide the country which provides intelligence with an unconditional guarantee that the confidentiality principle will never be set aside if the courts conclude that the interests of justice make it necessary and appropriate to do so.
Although the Foreign Secretary accepts that the principle is not absolute, he contends that, having made his own examination of the overall interests of justice, the control principle should be upheld. . . . I have been unable to eradicate the impression that we are being invited to accept that once the Foreign Secretary has made his judgement . . . that should be that. However, although in the context of public safety it is axiomatic that his views are entitled to the utmost respect, they cannot command the unquestioning acquiescence of the court.
Some in both the UK and the US have put forward that any disclosure of any kind based on any value or principle, be it personal or enshrined in law, can’t justified because of national security concerns. It is however important to ensure that the exercise of open justice and national security are not mutually exclusive. No one in the business of holding intelligence agencies legally accountable for their actions has ever contended that national security is a baseless construct for the containment of outside insurgency dating to imperialistic times. Global terrorism is real, and threats exist. We have thwarted some, and we have avoided others. But in an era where the word “terrorism” has been rendered virtually meaningless from overuse and the phrase “national security” has been thrown at both congressional and judicial reviews to order members of government’s silence and assent, it is hardly radical to request thorough oversight of counter-terrorism operations. In fact, it is an act of patriotism that highly regards the safety and security of fellow citizens. State hypervigilance is never a sign of a healthy democracy or a transparent society. It is a sign of paranoia that conflates of security with the status quo. An independent legislative review complete with muscular courts can restore not only political normalcy with temporary derogations but also help disclose information safely and in the interest of domestic prosecution of government abuses.
The CIA torture program has encompassed so many administrations and requested the skills and assets of so many agents worldwide that its investigation cannot be restricted to the US. Other states in intelligence-sharing agreements with the US must replicate Thomas’s actions. Each and every one of these countries has various degrees of dominance and subordination with the US and can exercise the control principle to release information on their activities and CIA demands should the US never be able to release its report. When it comes to intelligence sharing agreements, the US will lose its position of dominance.
(1). The Gibson Inquiry’s report has proved unsatisfactory on many levels. On the subject of rendition, it considers that the Marty and Fava reports are inconclusive and facts are unchecked. As the Inquiry itself stated, “The report does not find facts or reach conclusions. It is based on the scrutiny of documents, no witness has yet had the opportunity to explain or add to this information”. It is, therefore, thoroughly incomplete. Sir Peter Gibson himself acknowledged the report raised just as many questions.
(2). In an ironic twist surely not lost on anyone, Dearlove was referred to as the UK’s “own Snowden” in July 2013, when he revealed being in the process of penning a book detailing the events leading up to the Iraq war from his own perspective. Given the stalled state of the Chilcot Inquiry, Dearlove’s book could be a bombshell. A year later, Dearlove then demands more oversight for MI-6 and MI-5 operations, right after Sir Mark, ISC, was summoned to the Home Affairs Committee.
(3). The history of UKUSA from 1943 to 1955 is now available on the NSA website since 2010. The full declassified .pdf is here – Cold War centric infographics that seem to imply UKUSA is a relic of McCarthyism are on the National Archives website.